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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs moved to amend the original complaint on 
August 8, 1996. Assuming that the November 4, 1994 appointment 
date of a guardian for Brandon Holton is the operative date for 
purposes of the statute of limitations, then the motion to amend 
was timely and had it been correctly granted, would have eliminated 
a statute of limitations defense. Therefore, it was an error not 
to permit amendment of the complaint. 
Defendants assert that a 1987 amendment to Section 78-12-
36 U.C.A. was intended to create a statute of limitations period 
for minors for whom a guardian has been appointed, but still 
maintains a tolling period for Statute of Limitations purposes for 
minors, for whom no guardian has been appointed. This position is 
inconsistent with the history of Section 78-12-36 and an incorrect 
application of the 1987 amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
Plaintiffs moved to amend the original complaint on 
August 8/ 1996. Assuming that the November 4, 1994 
appointment date of a guardian for Brandon Holton is the 
operative date for purposes of the statute of 
limitations, then the motion to amend was timely and had 
it been correctly granted/ would have eliminated a 
statute of limitations defense. Therefore, it was an 
error not to permit amendment of the complaint. 
Defendants assert that the statute of limitations expired 
on Brandon Holton's claim on November 4, 1996, a date two years 
after the appointment of a legal guardian having the power to bring 
a wrongful death claim on Brandon's behalf. Assuming November 4, 
1996 is then the operative date for purposes of the statute of 
limitations (which is disputed regarding a minor's claim in Point 
II of this Reply Brief), then whether or not the original complaint 
was incorrectly titled became irrelevant because the defect, had 
the motion to amend been granted, would have been cured before the 
November 4, 1996 date, at which time the minor boys themselves 
2 
would have been served with the amended complaint. 
The body of the original complaint clearly identified the 
boys themselves as the alleged negligent parties. The allegations 
of the complaint were never against the parents of the boys, but 
instead, always against the boys themselves. There was never, 
contrary to the assertion in defendant Carstensen's brief, any 
claim against the parents, nor any attempt to reach their assets. 
Instead the complaint specifically alleged: 
9. The boys negligently and carelessly 
dislodged a rock weighing 2 0 to 2 5 pounds as 
they climbed above the vertical cliff face. 
The rock rolled down the mountainside and fell 
over the edge of the vertical cliff where it 
struck Elizabeth Holton on the head. 
The complaint itself was always correctly formed. Only 
the title was wrong. Therefore, before November 4, 1996, the 
strongest position the defendants can assert in this appeal is that 
the complaint was titled incorrectly. This is precisely a 
circumstance which Rule 15 is designed and intended to remedy, and 
had the motion to amend been granted, not only would the defect in 
the title of the complaint been remedied, but plaintiffs would have 
had ample time to serve the boys even before November 4, 1996. 
The motion to amend the complaint was made only six weeks 
after the original filing. There is no prejudice which any 
3 
defendant could show by an amendment at that point. The trial 
court abused its discretion in failing to allow the amendment. 
Trimm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993); Lewis v. Moultree, 627 
P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981). 
Point II 
Defendants assert that a 1987 amendment to Section 78-12-
36 U.C.A. was intended to create a statute of limitations 
period for minors for whom a guardian has been appointed, 
but still maintains a tolling period for Statute of 
Limitations purposes for minors, for whom no guardian has 
been appointed. This position is inconsistent with the 
history of Section 78-12-36 and an incorrect application 
of the 1987 amendment. 
The general law, virtually nationwide, is that a minor's 
claims are tolled during the minor's period of his minority. Utah 
has long followed this rule of law. Indeed, going back to at least 
1943, Utah has had a tolling statute for minors, among others. See 
104-2-37 (Code 1943). It was repealed by Laws 1951(one) , ch. 58 
Section 3, but was simultaneously reenacted as Section 78-12-36. 
In the 1953 Code (see appendix 1), the statute read: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than 
for the recovery of real property, is at the time 
the cause of action accrued, either: 
1) Under the age of majority; or 
2) Insane; or 
3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal 
court, for a term less than for life; 
4 
The time of such disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action, 
(emphasis added) 
In 1975, paragraph two (2) of Section 78-12-36 was 
amended. The word "Insane" was dropped and replaced with the 
phrase "(2) Mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian." 
The portion of paragraph two "and without a legal guardian" only 
modified the words "mentally incompetent." The words "and without 
a legal guardian" never modified paragraph 1 "Under the age of 
majority". In fact, the separate paragraphs of Section 78-12-36 
were always in the disjunctive. A person could be "either" under 
the age of majority "or" mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian. (See appendix 2) 
In 1987, the legislature took paragraph 3 relating to 
imprisonment out of the statute and simply dropped the numbering of 
paragraphs one (1) and two (2) . The Amendment Notes (see appendix 
3) state: 
The 1987 amendment deleted the subsection 
references in this section as set out in the 
bound volume, and deleted "imprisonment on a 
criminal charge or in execution under the 
sentence of a criminal court for a term less 
than for life" following "without a legal 
guardian" and made minor changes in phraseolgy 
and punctuation throughout the section. 
There is no identified intent to create, in the amended 
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statute, a change in its original and historical meaning, or to 
modify the intent of the former language contained in subsections 
1 and 2. 
To read such an intent into the amended statute is to 
move Utah away, not only from its own case law, but out of the vast 
majority of decisional law across the country. 
In the case of Scott v. School Board, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 
1977) , the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act which required plaintiffs to give notice 
of claim against the State within a certain period of time. The 
minor argued that the notice requirement was tolled by operation of 
the general tolling statute. The Utah Supreme Court agreed, saying 
minor claimants are entitled to tolling provisions "in all cases" 
because "[t]o hold otherwise is a denial of due process and equal 
protection." Id. At 748. 
In reaching this decision, the Court observed: 
parents, or natural guardians, have no 
specific legal duty to perform and have no 
responsibility to their minor off-spring other 
than their moral obligation. Consequently, in 
matters of this kind, when a parent... fails 
for one reason or another to give notice, file 
suit, or otherwise protect the minor's legal 
interests, the minor is left completely 
without a remedy. This was undoubtedly one of 
the prime considerations which prompted the 
legislature to toll the statute during the 
minority of a claimant [in the similar notice 
provision.] 
This holding is exactly in line with the majority rule 
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from across the country regarding minor's claims. See Scott v. 
First State Ins. Co., 456 N.W. 2d 152, 155 (Wis. 1990) ("The 
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations when the plaintiff is 
a minor is to enure that a minor's rights are not lost because a 
parent or guardian neglected to protect the minor by bringing a 
timely action."); Cross v. Pacific Gas and Electric, 388 P.2d 353 
(Cal. 1964); Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo. 
1961)(state policy to insure minor's rights are not impaired by 
failure of courts and attorneys to sufficiently present their 
cause); Severs v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 434 N.E. 2d 290, 292 (111. 
1982)(minor litigants entitled to special protection by courts, 
especially to ensure that their rights are protected from 
negligence of their representatives.) 
In the case of Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court said, concerning wrongful death 
claims that "since the cause of action is a personal property right 
of the heir, it would be consistent with prior interpretations of 
Utah law to hold the limitation period [concerning wrongful death 
claims] is tolled during the period of a minor's disability." 
To hold that the legislature in the 1987 amendment of 
Section 78-12-36 intended to have "without a legal guardian" now 
modify "under the age of majority" raises several distinct 
problems. First, such a holding is inconsistent with the long 
standing history of this statute and the case law in this state and 
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would represent a complete reversal of state policy. Secondly, 
such a holding would raise serious due process and equal protection 
concerns. As observed in Scott v. School Board, minors are 
entitled to tolling provisions "in all cases" because "[t]o hold 
otherwise is a denial of due process and equal protection." This 
denial of due process and equal protection would be further 
exacerbated by such a holding regarding the 1987 amendment because 
minors who have no legal guardian will still receive the full 
benefit of the tolling statute while those who have a legal 
guardian are held to a shorter statute and penalized because of 
negligence on the part of the guardian who has no legal duty to 
file any claim on behalf of the minor Scott v. School Board, Id at 
748; see also Hamilton by and through Hamilton v. Vaden, 721 P.2d 
412 (Okl. 1986) ("the guardian has the right, but not the 
obligation, to sue within the prescribed period of limitation. The 
guardian's failure to bring suit, or the discontinuation of a suit, 
within the statutory period does not prejudice the minor's rights." 
Id. 416.) Thirdly, it makes practical and logical sense that 
"without a legal guardian" only continue to modify "mentally 
incompetent." 
A mentally incompetent person might never overcome their 
disability, therefore, the appointment of a guardian insures that 
the individual will be able to exercise their rights, despite their 
disability. However, a minor's exercise of rights, such as pursuit 
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of a wrongful death claim, is not permanently impeded under any 
circumstance. The minor overcomes the disability within a 
cognizable period of time, i.e. upon reaching the age of majority. 
The only ones who may not do so are those who are permanently 
incompetent. Therefore, there is no logical or justifiable reason 
to create different categories for minors. 
Furthermore, the recent case of Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
Inc., 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah 1997) is not controlling on the 
above issues and should not be mistakenly cited as authority for a 
different holding. 
In Jensen, Shelly Jensen suffered injuries during the 
birth of her minor children which, 3 M years later, lead to her 
death. The statute of limitations on medical claims is two years. 
The legal claim for her injuries belonged to her, and in this case, 
to her legal guardian, who was appointed for her because she was in 
a coma during that time. 
A wrongful death claim, to the contrary, is "an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased, Van 
Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R., 186 P.2d 293, 303 (Utah 1947) Jensen 
Id. at 27. However, as pointed out in Jensen, when the wrongful 
death claim is based on some underlying wrong done to the decedent, 
the wrongful death claim is subject to defenses which could have 
been raised against the decedent, i.e. a statute of limitations 
defense. Citing Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, Section 
9 
127 at 955 (5th Ed. 1984) our Supreme Court recognized that: 
"the injured individual is not merely a 
conduit for the support of others, he is 
master of his own claim and he may settle the 
case or win or lose a judgment on his own 
injury even though others may be dependent on 
him." ... The majority of states refuses to 
allow a decedent's heirs to proceed with a 
wrongful death suit after the decedent has 
settled his or her personal injury case or won 
or lost a judgment before dying. Id. Given 
the underlying rationale, and given that the 
core purpose of any statute of limitations is 
to compel exercise of a right within a 
reasonable time to avoid stale claims, loss of 
evidence, and faded memories... . we see no 
reason to impose a different rule regarding 
the heirs' maintenance of a wrongful death 
suit where an injured patient has chosen to 
let the statute of limitations run on the 
underlying personal injury claim rather than 
settling or litigating the claim. Jensen, at 
27. 
In this case, Mrs. Jensen's minor daughter's claims were 
not tolled because the claim never belonged to them. It was a 
personal property right of their mother to be enforced on her 
behalf by her guardian subject to the medical negligence statute of 
limitations applicable to an adult claimant. Thus, Section 78-12-
36 was not implicated or brought into play in this instance. "The 
argument [that Section 78-12-36 is applicable] fails because the 
children's situation does not fit within the tolling statute's 
terms.... Shelly's children were not entitled to bring an action 
for wrongful death because Shelly had an appointed guardian at the 
time of her death." Jensen, at 29. 
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Thus, Jensen never reaches the question of what Section 
78-12-36 (as amended in 1987) may or may not mean, and cannot be 
read as authority for the assertion that "and without a legal 
guardian" now modifies "under the age of majority." Indeed, 
footnote 5 to the Jensen decision specifically reserved 
consideration of the application of Section 78-12-36 to minors 
claims because in Jensen it was never brought into play. 
Therefore, the law of this State remains the holding in Switzer v. 
Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980). 
Conclusion 
Brandon Holton's claim is tolled by Section 78-12-36, 
Utah Code Annotated and the trial Court abused its discretion in 
failing to allow an amendment of the original complaint. 
The case should be remanded to the trial Court with 
instructions to reinstate Brandon Holton's wrongful death claim* 
Dated this ff day of ](&£*H40LsL , 1997. 
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN 
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APPENDIX 
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of action was barred by 104-2-22, 104-
2-23, and 104-2-24, subdivisions 2 and 
3, then plaintiff in his reply, as required 
by 104-11-1, must s ta te the conditions 
tolling the s ta tu te prescribed by this 
section, and defendant corporation is not 
required to prove compliance by it with 
requirements of Code 1953, 16-8-1 and 16-
8-3 imposed on foreign corporations. Claw-
son v. Boston Acme Mines Development 
Co., 72 XI. 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. E. 
1318. 
7. Doctrine in equity. 
Absence of defendant from state does 
not preclude interposition of defense of 
laches to suit for an accounting, even 
though statute of limitations has not 
barred proceeding. Smith v. Smith, 77 U. 
60, 68f 291 P. 298. 
78-12-36. Effect of disability.—If a person entitled to bring an action, 
other than for the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of 
action accrued, either: 
(1) Under the age of majority; or, 
(2) Insane; or, 
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sen-
tence of a criminal court, for a term less than for life;— 
The time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-36. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is identical, with the ex-
ception of the deletion of phrase "But 
such action may be commenced within one 
year after such disability shall cease" 
which was deleted from former section 
104-2-37 (Code 1943) which was repealed 
by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, §352; 
Idaho Code 1947, § 5-230 (substantially 
identical, except tha t omitted is the con-
cluding language herein, "but such action 
may be commenced * * *"; an added provi-
sion is as follows: "4. A married woman, 
and her husband be a necessary par ty 
with her in commencing such act ion") . 
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §93-2703 
(similar; time so limited cannot be ex-
tended more than five years by any such 
disability, except infancy; or, in any case, 
more than one year after disability 
ceases). 
Cross-Reference. 
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 15-
2-2. 
Collateral References. 
Limitation of Actions<§=^70(l). 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 216. 
Personal disabilities, 34 Am. Jur . 155, 
Limitation of Actions § 192 et seq. 
Appointment of committee for incom-
petent or guardian for infant as affect-
ing running of s tatute of limitations 
against him, 128 A. L. R. 1379. 
One wrongfully adjudged or committed 
as insane as within benefit of provision of 
s tatute of limitations allowing time to 
sue after removal of disability, 166 A. L. 
R. 960. 
Proof of unadjudged incompetency 
which prevents running of s tatute of lim-
itations, 9 A. L. R. 2d 964. 
Statute providing that an insane person, 
minor, or other person under disability 
may bring suit within specified time after 
removal of disability as affecting right 
to bring action before disability removed, 
109 A. L. R. 954. 
Tacking disabilities for purposes of the 
statute, 53 A. L. R. 1303. 
DECISION UNDER FORMER LAW 
1. Applicability of section. 
This section had no application in 
action against town which was barred 
because of failure to file claim. Hurlev 
v. Town of Bingham, 63 U. 589, 228 P. 
213. 
78-12-37. Effect of death.—If a person entitled to bring an action dies 
before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, 
and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced by his 
representatives after the expiration of that time and within one year 
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78-12-36 JUDICIAL CODE 
of limitations as to judgment, 27 A L R 
2d 839 
Acknowledgment or payment effective to 
toll s tatute against corporation on obhga 
tion upon which it is bound as a co ob 
hgor with a corporate officer as supporting 
an inference of acknowledgment which 
will toll s tatute as against latter, or vice 
versa, 144 A L R 1015 
Nonresidence or absence of defendant 
from state as suspending or tolling stat 
ute of limitations, where relief is sought, 
or could have been sought, by an action 
or proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, 
119 4 L R 331 
Provision in s ta tute of limitations as to 
absence from state as applied to a non 
resident individual who has an office or 
place of business m the state, 61 A L R 
391 
Provision of s ta tute excluding period of 
defendant's absence from the state as ap 
plicable to a local cause of action against 
individual who was a nonresident when the 
same arose, 17 A L R 2d 502 
Provision of s ta tute of limitation ex 
eluding period of absence of debtor or 
defendant from state as applicable to ac 
tion on liability or cause of action ac 
crumg out of state, 148 A L R 732 
History L 1951, ch 58, § 1 , C 1943, 
Supp , 104-12 36, I*. 1975, ch 67, § 16 
Compiler's Notes 
This section is similar to former section 
104 2 37 (Code 1943) which was repealed 
by Laws 1951 ch 58 § 3 except tor the 
deletion of the concluding phrase "But 
such action may be commenced within one 
year after such disability shall cease " 
The 1975 amendment substituted "Men 
tally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian" in subd (2) for "Insane " 
Cross References 
Actions to recover real property, effect 
of disability, 78 12 21 
Age of majontv, 15 2 1 
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 15 
2 2, 15 2 3 
Provision suspending limitations while 
defendant is a nonresident or without the 
state as affected by nonresidence of party 
asserting cause of action, 83 A L R 271 
Right to enter judgment by confession 
as affecting suspension of statute of hmi 
tations during absence of debtor from 
state, 172 A L R 997 
Statutory provision denying or limiting 
right of nonresident, or of resident absent 
from state, to benefit of s tatute of limi-
tations, as affected by fact that he was 
subject to service of process during ab 
sence or nonresidence, 119 A L R 859 
Tolling of statute of limitations during 
absence from state as affected by fact 
that party claiming benefit of limitations 
remained subject to service during ab 
sence or nonresidence 55 A L R 3d 1158 
Vahdi tv and construction of war enact 
ment in United States suspending o p e n 
tion of statute of limitations 137 A L E 
1440, 140 \ L R 1518 145 A L R 1473 
War as suspending running of limita 
tions in absence ot specific statutory pro 
\ is ion to that effect 137 A L R 1454, 
140 A L R 1518, 141 A L R 1511, 145 
A L R 1473 
Product LiabihU \ c t , limitations pro 
\ is ions applicable regardless of disability, 
78 15 3 
Nonresident motorists 
Nonresident motonsts were not absent 
from the state so as to toll running of 
statute of hmit i t ions although they left 
state immediately after automobile col 
hsion and remained without state, as they 
had an agent in person of secretary of 
state upon whom process could have been 
served under 41 12 8 Snvder v Clune, 15 
U (2d) 254, 390 P 2d 915 
Notice of claim requirements 
This section had no application to ac 
tion against town which was barred be 
cause of failuie to file claim Hurley v 
Town of Bingham, 63 U 589, 228 P 213, 
construing former s tatute 
78-12-36 Effect of disability—If a person entitled to bring an action, 
other than for the recovery of real property is at the time the cause 
of action accrued, either 
(1) Under the age of majority, or, 
(2) Mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or, 
(3) Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sen-
tence of a criminal court, for a term less than for life,— 
The time of such disabilit} is not a part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action 
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—Defendant's family. 
The full time that the debtor is out of the 
state must be excluded in computing the time, 
notwithstanding fact that debtor's family may 
have residence or place of abode in state and 
tha t seYv\cfc of process could be made vipotv 
some member of debtor's family at its residence 
or place of abode Keith-O'Brien Co v Snyder, 
51 Utah 227, 169 P 954 (1917) 
—Statute tolled. 
Maintenance of residence within state with 
persons living therein did not prevent tolling of 
statute of limitations BueYl v Duchesne Mer-
cantile Co , 64 Utah 391, 231 P 123 (1924) 
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78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, the time of 
the disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-36; L. 1975, ch. 67, § 16, 1987, 
ch. 19, § 5. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes — The 1987 amend 
ment deleted the subsection references in this 
section as set out in the bound volume and 
deleted "imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal 
court, for a term less than for life" following 
"without a legal guardian" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1987, ch 19 § 6 
provides that the amendment to this section 
applies only to causes of action that arise after 
April 27 1987 and has no retroactive applica-
tion 
Cross-References. — Actions to recover 
real property, effect of disability § 78-12-21 
Age of majority § 15-2-1 
Disaffirmance of contract by minor, 
§§ 15-2-2, 15-2-3 
Guardians of incapacitated persons, 
§ 75-5 301 et seq 
Medical malpractice actions limitations pro-
visions applicable regardless of disability, 
§ 78-14-4 
Product Liability Act, limitations provisions 
applicable regardless of disability, § 78-15-3 
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